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Abstract. This paper takes a novel approach to trying to disentangle the impact of globalization on
wages by focusing on how the return to speaking English, the international language of commerce,
changed as South Africa re-integrated with the global economy after 1993. The paper ﬁnds that
the return to speaking English increased overall and that within racial groups the return increased
primarily for Whites but not for Blacks.
Address. Levinsohn: Ford School of Public Policy, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI
48109; JamesL@umich.eduGlobalization and the Returns to Speaking English in South Africa
James Levinsohn
University of Michigan
National Bureau of Economic Research
1. Introduction.
The literature on globalization and wages is, by the standards of economics, huge. It is a literature
that compensates for its volume by oﬀering precious little in the way of convincing results. This
is not (usually) the fault of the researchers. Rather, it is just very diﬃcult to identify the role of
international trade and/or investment on wages relative to the multitude of other factors that
inﬂuence wages (and which frequently occur simultaneously with globalization.) This has led
researchers to debate, for example, whether trade explains a growing wage gap between high wage
and low wage earners or whether the real determinant of increasing wage disparity is coincident skill-
biased technical change. Yet others (correctly) claim that even this dichotomy is a false one since
international trade and investment and skill-biased technical change are themselves co-determined.
With this cacophony as background, this paper steps back and experiments with a very diﬀerent
approach to investigating the impact of globalization on wages. Noting the special circumstances
around South Africa’s emergence from the Apartheid era (and the relatively closed economy that
accompanied the Apartheid era), this paper asks whether the return to speaking English (measured
in a narrow way) increased as the South African economy embarked upon its integration with the
rest of the industrialized world.
There is a certain logic to trying to measure the impact of globalization on wages in this manner.
Following the advent of democracy in South Africa in 1994, there were several huge changes in the
economy, many of which might be expected to change wages. One, but only one, of these changes
was South Africa’s re-integration with the global economy. Others included legislated changes in
the labor market (with an emphasis on aﬃrmative action) and the outbreak of the HIV/AIDS
pandemic. Decomposing the changes in South African wages into those fractions due to increased
disease, the dismantling of Apartheid and ensuing aﬃrmative action, changes in technology during
the 1990’s, and increased integration into the global economy is a Herculean (or outright impossible)
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Thomas as well as participants at the NBER’s conference on globalization and poverty. Thanks to Nzinga Broussard
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1task. Measuring changes in the return to speaking English is a simple task and I argue below that
it is one that at least stands a chance of shedding light on the impact of globalization on wages in
South Africa.
The underlying idea is that as South Africa re-integrated with the rest of the world, the return to
speaking an international language of commerce might plausibly increase. In South Africa, English
is that language. (The other widely spoken languages such as Zulu and Afrikaans are not used
much in international commerce.) It is less obvious why some of the other changes concurrent with
the fall of Apartheid should change the return to speaking English. It is, for example, unclear why
AIDS should have much of an impact on the returns to speaking English (although it almost surely
impacts wages.)1 Nor is it clear why the sort of skill-biased technological change that occurred
world-wide in the 1990s ought to impact returns to speaking English. Skill-biased technical change
probably changes the returns to diﬀerent levels of education but, conditional on education, it is
hard to see why this sort of technical change would elevate the returns to speaking English. It
is easier to suspect that aﬃrmative action might impact the return to speaking English. This is
a confounding inﬂuence that is explicitly discussed when presenting econometric speciﬁcation and
when interpreting results.
When substantial parts of the world did not openly trade with or invest in South Africa, there
was still a return to speaking English. South Africa, after all, was not Albania. There remained
some international trade, the mining industry produced traded goods, and there was some, albeit
minimal, international investment in South Africa. Each of these might support a return to speaking
English. Furthermore, speaking English was probably coincident with other factors that impacted
wages given South Africa’s history (see The Boer War.) For these reasons, this paper focuses
whether that return to speaking English changed. Of course, if there is no return to speaking
English in the ﬁrst place, searching for changes in that return is not especially informative.
This approach to investigating the impact of globalization on wages is intended as a complement
to the way economists usually address this question. My aims are pretty modest. This approach
will not oﬀer the deﬁnitive word on the impact of globalization on wages in post-Apartheid South
Africa. Put another way, hard to imagine evidence on language as being dispositive. Nonetheless,
when the cultural situation is appropriate, this approach might usefully add to the trade and wages
debate (a.k.a. ”cacophony.”). Furthermore, this approach uses the sort of survey data that has for
the most part been ignored in the trade and wages literature.
1 One can of course concoct stories, some of them plausible, but few involve as direct a link between global
integration and wages as that associated with the returns to speaking English
2This paper is not the ﬁrst to examine economic implications of speaking English. One paper
even does so in the context of considering globalization. Munshi and Rosenzweig (2003) use Indian
data to show that lower caste families are increasingly sending their female children to English
schools and this has encouraging implications for occupational outcomes. Most of the literature on
the returns to speaking English uses U.S. data and focuses on the role of language on immigrant
earnings. See, for example, Bleakley (2003), Bleakley and Chin (2004), and the literature cited
therein. A paper in this vein using U.K. data is Shields and Price (2002).
The paper proceeds in Section 2 by ﬁrst describing some of the changes in openness in South
Africa since the fall of Apartheid. Section 3 introduces the data that are used and provides some
descriptive statistics. Section 4 estimates changes in the return to speaking English, while Section
5 concludes.
2. Background
In 1993, the ﬁrst year of my data, South Africa was preparing for its ﬁrst nationally representative
election in decades. It was clear to all that a new government would be taking power in 1994. There
was, though, considerable uncertainty regarding just what economic policies would be pursued by
President Nelson Mandela. There were competing pressures to assure the international ﬁnancial
community of continued stability on the one hand, and to dramatically improve the lot of those
who had for decades been excluded under the policies of the previous governments (and who were
principally responsible for electing the new government) on the other hand.
South Africa quickly implemented a policy of macroeconomic stabilization to reassure the in-
ternational ﬁnancial community. Called GEAR for Growth, Employment, and Redistribution, the
policy seemed to contribute to stabilization of key macro indicators such as inﬂation, real interest
rates, and the budget deﬁcit. It is less obvious that the policy enhanced growth, employment, and
redistribution, but this of course depends on the counter-factual. Each component of the GEAR
moniker might have been that much worse in the absence of the policy.
Encouraged by the sober ﬁscal policies of GEAR, companies from around the world that had
hesitated before investing substantially in South Africa began to get oﬀ the sidelines. Foreign direct
investment skyrocketed. Table 1 presents data for foreign direct investment in millions of Rand.
The data in Table 1 show that annual FDI inﬂows went from only 33 million Rand to over
1.3 billion as soon as the new government was ensconced and proceeded to increase to over 6
billion Rand by 2000. The huge inﬂow for the ﬁrst half of 2001 is not typical and represents the
one-oﬀ purchase of De Beers by the London-listed Anglo American Corporation. Even excluding
3that transaction, 2001 showed continued healthy increases in FDI inﬂows. According to the South
African Reserve Bank, FDI was split pretty evenly between mining, manufacturing, and the ﬁnancial
sector.
South Africa also joined the WTO on January 1, 1995. Tariﬀs, never that high anyway, fell into
the single digit range. The largest barrier to trade during the Apartheid era, though, was never
tariﬀs. Rather, it was the willingness of the rest of the world to trade with South Africa. Under
the new government, South Africa entered into regional free trading agreements with the European
Union and with the Southern African Development Community. Trade, as a percentage of GDP,
increased substantially. Table 2 presents these ﬁgures. From 1991 to 1993, a period during which
it became pretty clear that Apartheid was going to be replaced with a representative democracy,
trade to GDP was pretty ﬂat. It was with the new government in 1994 that trade as a fraction of
GDP started to really increase. By 2000, the last year of my survey data, trade to GDP had risen
almost 50 percent from .424 to .611. The ratio continued to rise and was .704 in 2002. By almost
any standard, these are meteoric increases. Mirrored by the even greater increases in foreign direct
investment, there is little doubt that the South African economy “globalized.” South Africa clearly
became more integrated with the global economy after 1993. I turn now to the question of whether
the return to speaking English increased over the course of this period.
3. Data
This study uses data drawn from three South African household surveys-one from 1993 and two
from 2000. The 1993 data are from the LSMS household survey conducted by The World Bank.
This survey included about 44,000 individuals comprising just over 8800 households.2 The version
of the data often used by researchers contains about 300 variables.3 Information on language and
income are key variables for the study at hand. The data on language are not ideal due to the
way that the survey instrument was worded. In particular, language is a household-level variable
and the head of the household was asked to identify the ”main language spoken at home.”The fact
that language is a household-level variable is not of particular concern, since the language spoken
at home typically does not vary within the household. The fact that there is no information on
whether a person could speak English instead of whether it is the main language spoken at home is
2 A cleaned and ready-to-use version of the data set, along with a primer to analyzing household survey data in
STATA and the survey instruments are available at http://saproject.psc.isr.umich.edu/.
3 The original data set includes over 2000 variables although many of these are essentially individual-level variables
that are easily aggregated. Researchers who have used this data include Case and Deaton (1998), Thomas (1996),
and Duﬂo (2000) among others.
4a cause for concern and the results presented below must be considered in light of this. One would
of course like to know whether one could speak English and how well, not whether it was spoken
at home.
This is an example of one-sided measurement error. Some of those who are reported as not
speaking English (as measured by the language spoken at home) in fact can speak English quite
ﬂuently. On the other hand, few or none of those who stated that English was their ﬁrst language
were in fact unable to speak English. This is because the answer to the language question was asked
at the outset and determined the language in which the survey was administered. For example, if
someone who spoke only Zulu stated that English was their language, that individual would have
to then complete a multi-hour survey in English. It would not be hard to detect the mis-statement
of language in this instance.
The 1993 data on income are pretty good. The measure I use in this paper is an individual’s
total monthly income and is a constructed variable comprised mostly of wage income. It is common
in developing countries to highlight the importance of accounting for self-production of food to
properly compute income, but this is not an issue in South Africa. Own production is negligible.
For the 2000 data, I combine two surveys, the September 2000 Labour Force Survey (LFS) and
the 2000 Income and Expenditure Survey (IES).4
Although the surveys are not explicitly linked, it turns out that the same households were
included in both. The merged surveys result in a data set with about 101,000 individuals comprising
about 26,000 households. The language question is in the 2000 LFS while income comes from the
2000 IES. The wording of the language question is the same as 1993. It again asks about the
language spoken most often at home. The 2000 individual income data are used to compute
total individual income in a manner most comparable with the 1993 deﬁnition. This amounts to
subtracting various grants and pensions from individual income.
Table 3 presents frequency counts of language by race for each year of the sample. The sample
is taken only among those reporting positive income and between the ages of 20 to 60. The lower
bound is intended to exclude students and results are robust to a lower bound of 25 years instead of
the somewhat arbitrary 20. The advantage of using 20 years old instead of 25 is that the sample size
increases substantially. The upper bound is intended to exclude those receiving old-age pensions
since those clearly do not depend on language spoken. Also, old age pensions are not going to be
4 There was also an Income and Expenditure Survey in 1995 and a linkable household survey (the October
Household Survey). The 1995 IES and OHS are an attractive data source since questions are asked in the same way
and one can be comfortable that income is measured consistently across the 1995 and 2000 surveys. Alas, the 1995
survey ”forgot”to include the standard question on language.
5impacted by globalization as wage income might be. Some women begin to collect these pensions at
age 60, hence the upper bound. There are three key messages from Table 3. First, very few Blacks5
list English as their primary language. This is especially true in 1993 and it suggests that the return
to speaking English within Blacks is going to be identiﬁed oﬀ of precious few observations. Second,
Coloureds and Whites have a substantial numbers of English speakers. For each, Afrikaans is the
majority language and for each there are substantial shifts in the fraction of the population group
reporting English as their primary language. That fraction declines for Coloureds and increases
for Whites. Third, English is essentially co-linear with Indian so that it will not be possible to
separately identify the impact of English from the impact of being Indian on wages.
Whereas Table 3 indicated the racial composition of English speakers, Table 4 illustrates in which
sectors of the economy these English speakers work. Tabulating only individuals between the ages
of 20 and 60, Table 4 shows what fraction of workers in each of 11 sectors list English as their ﬁrst
language. That fraction is highest in Business Services (comprised mostly of the ﬁnancial sector)
at 35.75 percent in 1993 and 32.2 percent in 2000. Other sectors with large fractions of English
speakers (or, more accurately, English “listers”) include manufacturing, electricity, wholesale and
retail trade, and community services (which includes doctors, teachers, and lawyers.) In all sectors,
the fraction listing English declined from 1993 to 2000, usually modestly. There are in principle
two ways that the economy might adapt to an increased demand for English. The supply could
increase and/or the return could increase. Table 4 suggests that the supply did not increase. I turn
next to examining whether the return to speaking English increased.
4. The Return to Speaking English
The question at hand is whether the return to speaking English (as imperfectly measured) increased
as South Africa opened up to the international economy from 1993 to 2000. The return to speaking
English is not directly observable and so needs to be inferred from econometric evidence. The
approach adopted here is to estimate Mincer-like wage regressions and include as an explanatory
variable whether the wage-earner listed English as his or her primary language. While simple in
principle, several issues arise in practice.
First, it is necessary even in the cross-section to include as explanatory variables key determi-
nants of wages.6 Omission of an explanatory variable that itself might be correlated with speaking
5 I use the term “Blacks” since this seems to be preferred by most South Africans to the term “Africans” that is
used in the survey instrument. For data purposes, the two terms are interchangeable.
6 A diﬀerence in diﬀerences approach is ill-advised because of concurrent changes in many other variables impacting
6English will bias the estimate on the return to speaking English. Second, the many changes in
South Africa from 1993 to 2000 probably impacted many of the determinants of wages. It is widely
believed, for example, that the return to education and the wage diﬀerentials apparently due to
race changed over this period. Holding them constant and only allowing the return to English to
change will yield biased estimates of the true change in the return to speaking English. (On the
other hand, such an approach pretty much guarantees ﬁnding a pretty big change in the return to
speaking English.) Third, the fact that about 40 percent of English speakers are Indian and there
is virtually no language variation within this population group poses a challenge. The most ﬂexible
approach to estimating the returns to speaking English examines the change in that return within
population group yet this approach is going to be non-informative for Indians.
The simplest speciﬁcation regresses log individual income (yi) on indicator variables for each
value of j years of education (ED), experience (EX) , experience squared, an indicator variable
for whether the worker is male (M), indicator variables for population group ( CO–Coloured, IN–
Indian, and WH– White, with Blacks as the excluded group), and an indicator for whether English
is the language spoken at home (ENG). Experience is deﬁned as age minus 20. Hence,
lnyi = β0 +
j=13 X
j=2
β1,jEDj + β2EX + β3EX2 + β4M + β5CO + β6IN + β7WH + β8ENG + ￿i (1)
Equation (1) is estimated separately for each year of the sample using Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS) with the appropriate sample weights. Estimating the regression separately for each year is
necessary to capture the changes in returns to education between 1993 and 2000 as well as changes
in the return to being male and/or of a particular population group. Use of indicator variables for
each level of education permits returns to vary non-linearly with years. The coeﬃcient on English,
β8 is interpreted as the percentage wage diﬀerential attributable to speaking English conditional
on the other included regressors. The results from this speciﬁcation applied to the 1993 and 2000
data are presented in Table 5.
The results from 1993 are discussed ﬁrst to ﬁx ideas. The ﬁrst 12 rows show the usual returns to
education. For example, someone with 12 years of education, all else equal, earns about 168 percent
more than those with one year or less of education conditional on the other co-variates. The wage
wages. That is, while one could measure the diﬀerence in wages between those who list English as their ﬁrst language
and those who do not, and one could then examine the diﬀerence over time in this diﬀerence, the result would be
hard to interpret. This is because many other variables changed over this period and some of those changes are not
orthogonal to an observed return to speaking English.
7premium for being a member of a race other than Black ranges from 32 percent for Coloured to 98
percent for White. Males earn 46 percent more than similar females. The coeﬃcient of interest for
this study, though, is that on “English.” Conditional on education, experience, gender, and race,
people who list English as their primary language earn about 18 percent more than those who list
another language. This diﬀerential is quite precisely estimated.
Equation (1) is estimated using the 2000 data and the results are in column two of Table 5.
While there are several interesting comparisons between 1993 and 2000 to be made (the changing
pattern of the return to education for instance), the focus here is on the impact of speaking English.
The “English premium” jumps from .183 in 1993 to .252 in 2000. The 2000 premium is precisely
estimated and the change between the two years is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent than zero. Allowing
the entire pattern of returns to years of schooling to vary from 1993 to 2000, and allowing for
diﬀering returns to race, gender, and experience, it is still the case that the return to speaking
English increased substantially. This change in the English premium as well as its level are of
an economically large magnitude. By 2000, English speakers were earning about 25 percent more
after conditioning on other observables and the premium had increased by 7 percentage points since
1993.
The speciﬁcation reported in Table 5 imposes that the returns to education, experience, and
gender are identical across racial groups. A convincing body of research suggests this is too strong
an assumption. I proceed by looking for the English premium within each of the racial groups.
Doing so allows the returns on all the other observables to vary by racial group. This ﬂexibility
is clearly a good thing for it lets the data speak more “freely.” The ﬂexibility, though, will carry
a price. Thirty to forty percent of the sample that listed English as the language spoken at home
are Indian, and virtually all Indians list English as the primary language. There is, then, no within
group language variation for Indians. Hence, it is not feasible to estimate a return to speaking
English for Indians since that return is not identiﬁably diﬀerent than the return to simply being
Indian.7
Table 6 reports results from the within-group regressions for Blacks, Coloureds, and Whites.
In the interest of parsimony, only the coeﬃcient on speaking English is reported.8 This approach
7 It is possible to estimate a return to speaking English among Indians, but the eﬀect is identiﬁed oﬀ of 3 individuals
who listed “Other” in 1993 and about 6 Afrikaans-speaking Indians in 2000. The English premium, when separate
regressions are run for Indians, is never signiﬁcantly diﬀerent than zero.
8 Were it the case that the returns on the other observables (not reported in this table) did not vary signiﬁcantly
across racial groups, it would be eﬃcient to pool groups. Alas, coeﬃcients vary across groups and one can readily
reject the hypothesis that the returns to observables other than the English premium are the same across groups.
8is pretty ﬂexible. It allows the returns on all observables to vary both over time and across racial
groups.
As is usually the case with a more ﬂexible speciﬁcation, the messages are more mixed than
those reported in Table 5. The ﬁrst row of Table 6 reports the English premium from Table 5 for
comparison’s sake. The next three rows report the English premium for the other racial groups
(except Indian for reasons discussed above.) For Blacks, the English premium stayed constant
from 1993 to 2000. It was huge (about 60 percent) but did not increase over time, although the
precision of the estimate did increase. One should recall, though, that this premium is being
identiﬁed oﬀ of very few individuals– 6 out of 2468 in 1993 and 118 out of 20,222 in 2000. For
Coloureds, the return to speaking English fell about 11 percentage points. The decline, while not
large, is statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent than zero. The largest change from 1993 to 2000 in the
English premium impacted Whites. The return went from being basically non-existent in 1993 to
a precisely estimated 14.5 percent. Another way to interpret this result is that the “penalty” to
speaking Afrikaans among Whites skyrocketed.
The general pattern reported in Table 6 is robust to many alternative speciﬁcations. For exam-
ple, the inclusion of indicator variables for the province in which a household lives, using a single
variable for years of education instead of the more ﬂexible set of indicator variables, the exclusion
of the variable for male, using age 25 as a lower age bound, using 65 as an upper age bound, and
interacting the return to English with education all yield basically the same message when it comes
to the English premium. Namely, that premium became much larger for Whites, fell slightly for
Coloureds and for Blacks.9 These results, though, exclude a large number of those with positive
income for whom English is the ﬁrst language– Indians.
5. Concluding Remarks
Did globalization really cause the return to English to increase in South Africa? The evidence in
this paper is, in some cases, corroborating, but hardly conclusive. The strongest and most robust
result is the the return to speaking English increased for Whites over the period during which South
Africa re-integrated with the world economy. This result strong because it results from the ﬂexible
within-group estimates, and it is robust because it arises in all the investigated speciﬁcations. When
Indians are included and a (necessarily) less ﬂexible estimation strategy is adopted, I again ﬁnd that
the return to English increased and that the increase is precisely estimated. These are the results
9 For some speciﬁcation, the premium rises slightly for Blacks.
9in Table 5. If one thinks of these results as indicating an “average” eﬀect of speaking English, that
eﬀect is positive. There is less evidence, though, that the return to speaking English increased
among Blacks and Coloureds.
One explanation for the lack of an increase in the return to speaking English among Blacks is
the following. In 1993, there were few Blacks that spoke English and they earned a premium for
their language skills. With the advent of aﬃrmative action, the premium for speaking English fell
as more Blacks were promoted into higher paying jobs. In this case, it was no longer just the few
English speaking Blacks earning the relatively higher wages. This scenario illustrates one of the
diﬃculties of disentangling the impact of globalization (which might actually increase the return
to speaking English) with the impact of aﬃrmative action for Blacks (which was concurrent with
globalization and which might actually decrease the “extra” return to speaking English.)
There was no aﬃrmative action for Whites and among this group, the return to speaking
English clearly rose. Put another way the penalty for speaking Afrikaans rose for Whites. This is
consistent with capturing an impact of globalization. Afrikaans, unlike English, is much less useful
in international commerce. Those Whites whose ﬁrst language was English beneﬁted conditional
on education, gender, and experience. This is, as noted above, corroborating but not conclusive
evidence.
The ﬁnding that the return to speaking English did not increase for Coloureds muddles the
waters. Coloureds did not beneﬁt from aﬃrmative action as did Blacks under the new government.
Still, the return to speaking English did not rise and in fact fell. If globalization is what moves the
return to speaking English, one should have found an increase to speaking English among Coloureds
and this was not the case.
The evidence in the end is mixed. On the whole, the return to speaking English increased
but within racial groups, the pattern is not consistent.10 The approach adopted in this paper is
perhaps a novel way to revisit the wages and globalization issue. It is an approach that is especially
well-suited to developing countries, many of which have a rich variety of languages spoken, as
they integrate with the global economy. In other contexts (India, for example), or with better data
(industry of employment data, for example), the approach adopted here may prove more conclusive.
Or not. Even if language is an accurate way to isolate an impact of globalization on wages, it may
simply be that globalization has diﬀering impacts on diﬀering segments of a population. This
appears to be the case in South Africa.
10 It should be noted that precious few of the English speakers are among the very poor. In 1993, virtually none
are while in 2000 only a handful are. Hence, this approach does not speak to the role of globalization on the incomes
of the very poor.
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Notes: Source is www.resbank.co.za. Data are for imports and exports of goods and services
and annual GDP.TABLE 3
Primary Language Among Wage Earners
20 to 60 Years Old
1993
Language Black Coloured Indian White Total
English 6 160 232 202 600
Afrikaans 11 411 0 522 944
Xhosa 421 0 0 0 421
Zulu 624 0 0 0 624
Tswana 493 0 0 0 493
N. Sotho 285 0 0 0 285
S. Sotho 91 0 0 0 91
Venda 79 0 0 0 79
Tsonga 209 0 0 0 209
Swazi 173 0 0 0 173
Ndebele 69 0 0 0 69
Other 7 0 3 6 16
Total 2,468 571 235 730 4,004
2000
English 118 534 626 783 2,075
Afrikaans 230 3,032 6 1,540 4,838
Ndebele 435 0 0 0 435
Xhosa 3,789 17 0 0 3,806
Zulu 5,487 3 0 0 5,490
N. Sotho 2,238 1 0 0 2,239
S. Sotho 2,681 6 0 1 2,688
Tswana 2,601 17 0 0 2,618
Swazi 871 4 0 0 876
Venda 577 0 0 0 577
Tsonga 1,109 0 0 0 1,109
Other 72 2 22 19 120
Missing 14 0 0 0 14
Total 20,222 3,616 654 2,343 26,885
Note: 2000 row totals do not sum properly due to the exclusion of non-responses to the race
question.TABLE 4
Share of Industry Employment by Language
1993 2000
Sector Other English Other English
Agriculture 98.09 1.91 98.36 1.64
Mining 95.45 4.55 97.25 2.75
Manufactures 75.26 24.74 82.70 17.30
Electric 83.30 16.70 83.77 16.23
Construction 83.25 16.75 90.54 9.46
Wholesale and Retail 81.35 18.65 85.61 14.39
Transport 82.78 17.22 84.47 15.53
Business Services 64.25 35.75 67.76 32.24
Community Services 81.67 18.33 84.56 15.44
Private Households 99.11 0.89 97.58 2.42
Other 79.42 20.58 82.46 17.54
Total 84.87 15.13 86.95 13.05
Notes: Cell entries give the share of employment in a given industry that lists English as the
ﬁrst language. 1993 and 2000 data sets had diﬀerent industry categories and the above categories
reﬂect a concordance to the 2000 industry deﬁnitions. In particular, 1993 categories wholesale and
retail trade and restaurant and hotel were combined. Also, 1993 categories education, medical, and
legal were combined to form “community services.” Industry names are from the Stats SA Labour
Force Survey 2000 report, page vii.TABLE 5
The Returns to Speaking English
20 to 60 Years Old
1993 2000
ed2 -.093 .092
( .071) ( .035)
ed3 .219 .233
( .067) ( .038)
ed4 .299 .224
( .065) ( .036)
ed5 .449 .295
( .060) ( .034)
ed6 .472 .380
( .052) ( .031)
ed7 .733 .549
( .051) ( .030)
ed8 .622 .646
( .060) ( .032)
ed9 .948 .820
( .050) ( .030)
ed10 .993 .908
( .063) ( .031)
ed11 1.274 1.240
( .047) ( .027)
ed12 1.688 1.796
( .054) ( .031)
ed13 1.788 2.126
( .075) ( .036)
EX .062 .099
( .004) ( .002)
EX2 -.001 -.001
( .000) ( .000)
Coloured .326 .360
( .037) ( .020)
Indian .394 .421
( .071) ( .041)
White .984 .921
( .037) ( .021)
English .183 .252
( .043) ( .024)
Male .463 .501
( .024) ( .012)
Constant 5.041 7.183
( .050) ( .030)
R 2 .58 0.46TABLE 6










( .050) ( .036)